The Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) retained power in Delhi after a bitterly fought election, but quite easily in the end, becoming a rare incumbent to hold its vote share from one landslide election (the party’s share in 2015 was 54.3% and it is around 53.5% this time) to the next. Indeed, the most recent parallel would perhaps be the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) performance in the 2019 national elections, where it bettered its 2014 vote share of 31% by around six percentage points. Sure, the BJP also managed to increase its seat share, while the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) won 62 of the 70 seats in the Delhi assembly this time, as compared to 67 last time. This minor fall can be attributed more to the nature of the contests — multipolar but with one hegemonic pole in the national election, and strongly bipolar in Delhi — than anything else.
It wasn’t an easy battle for the AAP as it sought a third successive win in Delhi, a city-state where the Centre controls public order, land and services, including the power to appoint senior civil servants. If the footsoldiers of the party went from door to door spreading the message of governance, their strongest asset was their leader Chief Minister Arvind Kejriwal. Under whom the government had delivered on most of its promises including providing subsidised public goods, mainly electricity and water, as well as raising the quality of public education and healthcare. In the time of a sputtering economy, even the few hundred rupees saved through subsidies and welfare schemes would have endeared voters in Delhi to the AAP. Beyond its record in office, the party’s near-sweep of Delhi owes to Kejriwal’s tactical smartness in refusing to be drawn into a debate on the divisive and contentious issues that the BJP raised during the campaign. In fact, in the first phase of his term when he defied Prime Minister Narendra Modi almost every other day and was himself locked in a bruising battle with Raj Bhavan, Kejriwal quickly realised the diminishing returns of such a strategy. He changed tack and de-Modi-ised his discourse. That’s why when the BJP sought to inject hyper-nationalist rhetoric into the election, the AAP countered with its government’s work in education and healthcare. Kejriwal skillfully avoided the identity trap the BJP had laid for him in a highly polarised discourse. Overall, the AAP’s success in nearly replicating its 2015 win tells a remarkable story of political resilience, hard work and tactical acumen.
For the BJP, the Amit Shah-led high voltage campaign against Shaheen Bagh failed to fetch returns. The entire brass of the BJP, including much of the Union Cabinet, 200 MPs and leaders from neighbouring states including Adityanath, were fielded in the campaign. The anti-citizenship law protests in Shaheen Bagh were turned into a talisman of nationalism and a counter to the AAP’s governance-as-ideology politics. Clearly, few were impressed. In the absence of a strong state leader, the party, once again, leaned on Prime Minister Narendra Modi to win Delhi which it last won in 1993. But as the Assembly elections after the BJP’s spectacular Lok Sabha win in 2019 show, there are limitations to that strategy. Brand Modi may not have diminished but it doesn’t seem to enthuse fence-sitting voters when the playground is the state — which means interesting times ahead.
Why do Delhi voters dodge the BJP in assembly elections? After the party’s rather infamous defeat over soaring onion prices in 1998, the then BJP chief minister Sushma Swaraj, who reluctantly took over the position two months before the election, returned to national politics. Since then, the BJP has never been able to develop a leader with a mass base in the city-state. The party may have leaders who represent their specific communities or their respective localities, but they do not have the stature of the late Sheila Dikshit or Arvind Kejriwal, who could simultaneously appeal to the affluent, the middle classes and the poor. The diversity of Delhi demands a charismatic leader who can connect with migrants, resonate with Delhi’s villages, and fulfil the aspirations of those living in upper class localities.
The Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) must celebrate this much-deserved victory. The party had not won a single election since 2015 and, thus in many ways, this election was a do-or-die battle. The party had lost in the Punjab assembly elections in 2017, performed poorly in the Delhi municipal elections, and came third in five of the seven seats during the 2019 Lok Sabha elections.
It ran a positive campaign, highlighting its performance in improving the quality of government schools and mohalla clinics, providing subsidised water and electricity, and ensuring free public transport for women. It stayed clear of making this election a personality contest between Narendra Modi and Kejriwal, or challenging the ideological narrative set by the BJP leadership.
The BJP may take solace in the fact that it managed to increase its vote share, and, less significantly, its seat tally. However, it must realise the limits of a high-pitched campaign on the party’s ideological plank. This may keep the cadre enthused, but it is unlikely to bring middle-of-the-road voters into the party’s fold. This swing constituency seeks more — credible leadership, government performance, delivery of public services, and access to public servants. In the absence of this, ideologically-neutral and non-partisan voters will maximise their calculus and split their loyalties — vote Modi and the BJP for the Lok Sabha, and Kejriwal and the AAP for the assembly elections. This is the most pertinent electoral trend in post-2019 India.
Should the result be seen as a rejection of the BJP’s ideological platform? It is natural for the Opposition parties and civil society activists to paint the AAP’s overwhelming victory in Delhi as a negation of the BJP’s position on the Citizenship (Amendment) Act-National Register of Citizens-National Population Register issue, and its stand on protest sites like Shaheen Bagh. The BJP’s failure in this election should not be considered a referendum on these issues. The AAP did not campaign and challenge the BJP on its ideological platform. Neither did the AAP take on Modi’s leadership nor did it take firm positions on the unrest in Jawaharlal Nehru University, Jamia Millia Islamia, or Shaheen Bagh. The AAP may have been forced to adopt an electorally pragmatic posture, but in some ways, the party’s victory has moved the fulcrum of Indian politics further to the Centre-Right.
Recent opinion polls suggest that a significant number of voters who supported the AAP in this election endorse the BJP’s ideological viewpoint. The AAP won as it delivered on governance, offered more credible leadership to voters, and did not challenge the ideological worldview of the median voter in Delhi. A soft line on religion (endorsing the religious practices of the majority community), playing on the same nationalist pitch (a hawkish national security plank), with a heavy dose of populist welfarism, is likely to be the new normal in Indian politics. This certainly emerges as a strong template for non-BJP parties to mount an electoral challenge to the BJP in the states. Undoubtedly, each electoral setback will aggregate itself into a grand narrative against Modi and home minister Amit Shah. This will dent the perceived invincibility of the BJP, and raise questions about the effectiveness of the party’s organisational machine and resource advantage, and the agility of its leadership. The BJP now urgently needs a new script to win state elections.
