India’s State-run Oil and Natural Gas Corporation secured a license from the US last week to restart operations in Venezuela. It is classic imperialism, and India is a party to it
Charu Sudan Kasturi
While speaking at a business news publication’s conclave in New Delhi, the external affairs minister, S. Jaishankar, was asked about India’s ‘on-off’ policy when it comes to energy imports from countries opposed to the United States of America, such as Russia. Jaishankar, quick with words, responded that the country’s consumers were always the Indian government’s top priority. For the government, he emphasised, Indian citizens were never “off”.
Irrespective of whether the Indian public believes that, the Narendra Modi government is increasingly ‘on’ as far as following Washington’s unilateral economic threats and actions towards the world — even when they violate long-standing Indian policy. While some of the US’s closest traditional allies are pushing back against the Donald Trump administration, India’s approach gives Washington a veto over what should be New Delhi’s choices.
The specific question Jaishankar was answering in New Delhi related to a bill in the US Congress that threatens to impose massive tariffs on goods from countries that buy Russian oil and gas. The question was legitimate. India had dramatically ramped up its import of Russian oil following the start of the war on Ukraine at a time when Europe decided to wean itself off Russian energy. But in the face of a 50% tariff imposed by Trump on Indian goods last year, half of it as punishment for the Russian energy imports, India cut back on its purchase of oil from Russia just as sharply. Then, as the US-Israel war on Iran led to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and spikes in global crude prices, Trump tried to calm markets by issuing sanctions waivers for countries to temporarily purchase Russian oil — so Indian imports went up once more. Will it now turn the tap off again to avoid upsetting the US?
hat question is not limited to relations with Russia. Indeed, if there is a redeeming feature in Trump’s eccentric diplomacy, it is that he gives countries several chances to stand up to his imperial diktats. Trump’s threat to punish countries that continue to trade or deal in any way with Iran is the Indian government’s latest opportunity to show some spine. Already, by kowtowing to Trump’s sanctions against Iran during his first term, the Modi government reduced its energy options. Until a decade ago, Iran was India’s third-largest source of oil. Today, India imports almost no Iranian crude and their trade is negligible. India has had to give up its stakes in the Chabahar port development project, a critical strategic asset it was developing for economic and national security. Equally critically, it has given up diplomatic equity in its neighbourhood, seen across West Asia as much closer to the US and Israel than to more traditional friends such as Iran. Again, India briefly imported Iranian oil this past summer — when the US allowed it to, as part of the bid to keep crude prices under control.
Then there is Venezuela, another chapter in a now recurring theme. As with Iran, it was a major supplier of oil but India turned the spigot off during Trump’s first term, even though Indian State oil companies have major investments in the South American country. Once again, the Indian government has now started buying Venezuelan oil in large quantities because the US is allowing it to after abducting the country’s president, Nicolás Maduro, and replacing him with a successor hand-picked by America. Proceeds from the purchase of Venezuelan oil go not to Venezuela but to the US, which then decides how much and for what that money will be used. .
The government and its supporters will no doubt argue that these trade gymnastics actually reflect flexible realpolitik. They will point out that attracting the US’s tariff ire would mean job losses in export-oriented Indian businesses, and that compromising is the smart move. Perhaps. But when the adaptability so closely shape-shifts with the fluctuating demands of one country and its leader, it looks and feels like the Indian government is dancing to someone else’s tune rather than insulating itself from unjustified pressure. And that someone else is not the Indian consumer.
Charu Sudan Kasturi is a journalist who writes on foreign policy and international relations
