The welding together of a bunch of unconnected and unrelated territories, inhabited by sharply contrasting ethnic, linguistic and cultural identities, by unconcerned peoples, into a new State of ‘ Jammu and Kashmir, for their own aggrandizement and profit, was a rare event that history has seldom witnessed.
—Dr.Ahad
“In consideration of the services rendered by Raja Gulab Singh of Jammu to the State [Lahore Darbar] towards procuring the restoration of the relation of amity between the Lahore and British Governments, the Maharaja [Duleep Singh] hereby agrees to recognize the independent sovereignty of Raja Gulab Singh in such territories and districts in the hills as may be made over to the said Raja Gulab Singh by separate agreement between himself and the British Government with dependencies thereof which may have been in the Raja’s possession since the time of Maharaja Kharak Singh; and the British Government, in consideration of the good conduct of Raja Gulab Singh, also agrees to recognize his independence in such territories and to admit him to the privilege of a separate Treaty with the British Government”.
The carefully planned and self-explanatory contents of the Treaty of Lahore marked the beginning of well thought out, and mutually agreed Anglo-Sikh programme of the formation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir on which the signatories set their seal of approval on March 9,1846 A.D. But the formal State formation programme was put into effect with the ratification of a separate agreement, known as the Treaty of Amritsar that was signed between the British and Gulab Singh on March 16,1846 A.D.
The crucial feature, however, of both these Treaties was the collaboration of forces unconnected with Kashmir, who were commuted, not to the well-being of the Kashmiris, but to promoting their own political, commercial and military dominance, for deliberating and deciding about the future of a nation completely scowled at and rejected as goods and chattels. Even the mighty Mughals; the ferocious Afghans and the despotic Sikhs had not dared to embark on their task of annexing Kashmir without the active support of the local people. But the Anglo-Sikh and the British-Dogra combine gave not least towards searching out the likes of Sheikh Yaqub Surfi, Baba Dawood Khaki, Abdal Bhat, Muhmmad Bhat and Birbal Dhar-—who had been instrumental in paving the way for the alien occupation of Kashmir —- to legitimize and justify their endeavours of political hobnobbing and blackmailing.
Thus, the welding together of a bunch of unconnected and unrelated territories, inhabited by sharply contrasting ethnic, linguistic and cultural identities, by unconcerned peoples, into a new State of Jammu and Kashmir, for their own personal aggrandizement and profit, was a rare event that history has seldom witnessed. It was an extraordinary occurrence of weaving an unholy political, social and territorial alliance out of the dreams of uninvited aliens who invented a political chess-game of thought to, eventually, justify their illegitimate action and solace the helplessness and naivety of the natives. The ascendancy of these aliens had already taken a cultural as well as a political and economic form, and they had emerged as a dominant force in India to subvert the socio-economic order of many of its States by entangling them in a thorny bush of dissension and discord, and by convoluting plots with their local enemies. They had absorbed most of the Indian States to become a political suzerainty from a mere trading company, and had reached northern India to engage themselves in dismantling the Maratha power in order to establish their own paramountcy; the British paramount power which they successfully set on its legs to further spread its wings onto the surface of Afghanistan. But the Sikh Kingdom was a great stumbling block to setting their score with the Kabul Government. It had almost blocked the passage of its troops to Kabul where they had already installed their puppet, Shah Shuja as Amir in place of Dost Muhammad Khan. The British impatience to find an easy solution to the Afghan problem and the Sikh obstinacy to refuse them a passage brought the two on the brink of hostilities which, eventually, culminated in the Anglo-Sikh war of 1845 A.D., in which the Khalasa army was defeated and the Lahore Government was compelled to offer Kashmir in part-exchange of war indemnity.
Before the first quarter of nineteenth century, the English East India Company had transformed itself into a most powerful political power of India. While other regions were relinquishing their sovereignty to the British, Punjab was emerging into a powerful Kingdom under an illiterate genius, Maharaja Ranjit Singh. Determined to reach his apogee, he did not think it advisable to come in the way of the British expansionism. Realizing the importance of rapidly expanding British influence and its possible consequences, Ranjit Singh decided to cultivate friendly relations with them. He granted them numerous concessions; he abandoned his idea of conquering Sindh; acknowledged the British maritime supremacy; supported them both morally and materially in their occupation of Afghanistan.
But the declining political effectiveness of Ranjit Singh’s successors, and the increasing economic weakness of the Lahore Kingdom constantly preoccupied the Khalasa to even appreciate the growing political importance of the British. With the decline of the Sikh power, thus, began the decline of Anglo-Sikh relations. The inheritors of Ranjit Singh’s throne failed to enjoy the British goodwill and fell from their favour when they came to be suspected of complicity in the Napalese-Sikh diplomatic hobnobbing, and when they showed lukewarm response to the British presence in Afghanistan.
The Sikh attempts to block the passage of British troops to Kabul through Punjab further strengthened their anti -Khalasa feeling. The Sikh perverse contumacy, thus, drew the English towards contemplating the conquest of Punjab. Baylay, the president of the Company’s Board of Control wrote to John Hobhouse:
Even if the holding of a force in Afghanistan should be necessary, we should find in the resources of the Punjab resources necessary for their maintenance; we could reinforce them without difficulty; and with Cashmir on our flank, the whole line of is the Indus in our possession we might defy all attacks whether from European or Asiatic enemies.
The British interest in the Punjab affairs was deeply whetted by the gradual decline of the Sikh power; by its decentralization and the rising influence of its local officials. But they were in no hurry to let their imperial intentions be known at this juncture; they guarded these against being suffused with delight while witnessing the Khalasa descending star. They adopted a wait-and-watch policy; carefully observing the activities of the feuding parties at the Lahore Darbar; waiting for an opportune time to strike.
The symptoms of the Sikh decline had appeared earlier when Maharaja Ranjit Singh was still in frill command of the Punjab situation. But his resolve to rule effectively had begun to wither away with his ailing health when he looked worn out and helpless in face of new developments that engaged his imbecile successors in a fratricidal struggle for the Khalasa throne. His leadership potential was gradually fading away; making him incessantly indecisive and victim of indignation at the sudden steep rise in the lusciousness of the Punjabi nobility. The growing discontent among the Sikh soldiery too had a perturbing influence on the Maharaja. The Khalasa Kingdom’s outposts were simmering with the rage of hungry soldiers; they were preparing for a mutiny; their mutinous outburst was inevitable to disintegrate the Sikh power. It was only a question of when.
The inevitable happened. The death of Maharaja Ranjit Singh unleashed a storm of pent-up resentment against the new Government; swallowing the entire Kingdom; prompting the British to win to their side as many feuding chiefs as they could, especially the Dogra brothers: Dhyan Singh and Gulab Singh, who were ruthlessly ambitious to dominate the politics of the Sikh State; an eventuality that was recognized to help them to establish a ‘due control over their aggrandizements’. The fluidity of the situation also prompted them to reinforce their military strength to be able to protect their interests and ensure their complete victory in the eventuality of a war with the Khalasa. They were harbouring a secret agenda of dismembering the Sikh State; even the promptitude shown by Sher Singh in sending the Sikh troops to escort the British army into the Khyber did not deter them from their resolve.
There was no suitable occasion for the English to break their endurance than that of the Sikh army had a mutiny on their hands and when bitterly polarized Punjabi aristocracy had thrown the Lahore Government into complete disarray. Combined with this was the neo-rich Punjabi community ‘prepared to go to the length of even sacrificing their independence and honour of their country’. Moreover, the entire Sikh community was moving towards great shock and bitterness by witnessing the royal prestige coming under cloud as a result of scandalous relationship of their Maharani, Rani Jindan with her paramours (especially Lai Singh to mention only the key figure). Dwelling on the subject, Keightley writes:
The Ranee herself drank to such excess that her faculties began to be impaired and she was sinking into stupor; her lust also knew no bounds; Lai Singh, but not he alone, was her known paramour.
The Rani was even pregnant by Lai Singh. When she fell ill he was sternly warned by the Darbar:
If it appeared she were now with child and lost her life the Misser should be put to death.
Referring to the growing confusion at the Lahore Darbar, Lord Hardinge wrote:
.. .The government of [the Sikhs] is carried on by a drunken prostitute [Rani Jindan]— her councillor— her paramour….The treasury has in it we hear not more than 2 months pay When these means are at an end most of the army will become plunderers and robbers…
The situation was quite ripe to lure the British into an adventure to destroy the Sikh power. A powerful and energetic supporter was present and waiting to espouse their cause and ready to carry out to the uttermost whatever orders were given by the English Government’. He was not a Punjabi; he was the Dogra wazir of the Sikh Kingdom, Gulab Singh who played a treacherous role of double dealing. He secretly reached an understanding with the British, detrimental to the very Government he headed, and won their faith and confidence by causing ‘disturbances in the whole Sikh Kingdom’. To Brigadier Wheeler he conveyed, through his messenger, that in the event of Anglo-Sikh war Gulab Singh ‘wished to cast in his lot with the [British],’ as his existence depended on their successes, and the pledge of this collaboration was reiterated. Broadfort reported:
He [Gulab Singh] wishes to cause disturbances in the whole Sikh Kingdom and he says he will carry out to the uttermost whatever orders may be given by the English Government…. If ordered he has force and will serve with life and property ….That the Jageerdars of the hills, those of Cashmeer, of Hazara….must be considered friends and servants of the English.
Simultaneously, Gulab Singh induced the Sikh Panchayat and the army to acknowledge him their leader and render him support against the British. He stabbed the Sikhs in the back by his calculated duplicity which landed the contenders into the war field for a fierce fighting. Thus, by a rare display of docility and duplicity, Gulab Singh complicated the Anglo-Sikh relations to get embroiled in a war of far reaching consequences which, eventually, resulted in the partial dismemberment of the Sikh Kingdom and founding of a separate State of Jammu and Kashmir- comprising Kashmir, Jammu, Gilgit and Ladakh— as a reward to him in recognition of his services to the British during the confrontation.
In this war the Sikh army was routed and the dreams of their victory and prospect of booty — they were lured by the prospects of booty and opportunity of winning glory into the war— were shattered by the political deception and trickery of their own Government, the naivety of their Panchs and the desertion from their chiefs, rather than the valour and superiority of the British forces. Even Lai Singh and Tej Singh, the most trusted confidants of Rani Jindan, deserted the Sikh cause by their unfailing cooperation with the British authorities. While Tej Singh, the commander-in-chief, fled from the battle field and broke the bridge on the Sutlej, making the retreat of his army impossible, Lai Singh fled from the scene of action at Mudki to destroy the Khalasa’s strength. Gulab Singh took a series of steps to lower-the Sikh morale; he disrupted the regular dispatch of food supplies to the Sutlej; declined to send additional war material; replaced the Sikh soldiers with his own; treated well the captured British soldiers; tilted the balance of war in favour of the enemy in the battle of Sobroan; bringing, thus, total catastrophe to the Lahore Kingdom by his manoeuvres to circumvent the Punjabi determination to fight the war in which they had been involved emotionally by the promises of ‘cash, ammunition and food’ , Gulab Singh’s duplicity did not stop there; it continued debilitating the political skill and maneuverability of the Khalasa not infrequently. To advance his own hidden agenda he once again deceived the Sikhs into suing for peace by ratiocinating the inevitability of their defeat, and the efficacy and profitability of a peaceful settlement of the dispute with the British. The stupefying stupidity of the Khalasa-Darbar combine, thus, let them fall in his trap. They entrusted him with the task of mediating a settlement and authorized him to the extent that they ‘would agree to stand by any treaty he made even if by that treaty the city of Lahore was offered as a peshkush ’ [gift] to the English. Having duped the Sikhs into the belief that he alone could save their nation from the inevitable doom, Gulab Singh set out to seek a compromise with the English.
The two sides met at Kasur and on 15 February 1846 A.D., Gulab Singh negotiated the terms with the political secretary privately. After reaching an understanding with the British, he succeeded in persuading the Sikh delegation, accompanying him on the occasion, to accede to all the demands of the English including; the payment of one and one-half crores of rupees in indemnity; the reduction of the Sikh army; the cession of territory between the Sutlej and Beas. But Kashmir did not figure in the proposed terms; its mention was tacitly and glibly omitted to thwart any possibility of the Sikh retaliation, the indication of which had come from an angry letter of Rani Jindan to Henry Lawrence with the warning that‘if Kashmir were given to Gulab Singh she will appeal directly to Queen Victoria’.
Knowing well that the financial bankruptcy would fail Khalasa State to pay the huge amount of indemnity, the English decided to acquire Kashmir for Gulab Singh when circumstances favoured them to strike a hard bargain on it as compensation for the stipulated amount. Their premonition did not betray them; things happened as they had desired; the Sikhs agreed to the British demands. The agreement was signed on March 9,1846 A.D. The article IV of the agreement, known as the Treaty of Lahore, stipulated to cede the entire hilly area between the Beas and the Indus in addition to Kashmir in compensation for the indemnity. But the British acquired Gulab Singh’s territory merely on paper for the article Xll stated that he would be made independent ruler of ‘such territories in the hills as may be made over to him by a separate agreement between himself and the British Government’.
This separate agreement known asTreaty of Amritsar was signed on March 16,1846 A.D., just seven days after the ratification of the Treaty of Lahore. Dogra Raja, Gulab Singh was formally recognized as the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir by the article 1 of the Treaty which stated that the British Government:
Transfers and makes over for ever in independent possession to Maharaja Gulab Singh and the heirs male of his body all the hilly or mountainous country with its dependencies situated to the eastward of the River Ravi including Chamba and excluding Lahaul, being part of the territories ceded to the British by the Lahore State
This act of benevolence, and reward for his support thrilled the heart and soul of the new Maharaja with such excitement that he stood up to speak the truth; and with his folded hands and gushing gratitude to the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, he described himself as a ‘zarkhareed’, a gold- boughten slave. But in consideration of this favour, the new Maharaja had to pay to the English ‘the sum of seventy- five lakhs of rupees (Nanakshahee)’. And by another article, the British retained the suzerainty of the new State in their own hands.The article X stated:
Maharaja Gulab Singh acknowledges the supremacy of the British Government, and will in token of such supremacy, present annually to the British Government one horse, twelve perfect shawl goats of approved breed (six male, and six female), and three pairs of Cashmere shawls.
Gulab Singh was, thus, acknowledged as Maharaja merely in theory, but actually he was a British vassal; a faithful servant of Sahibs whose unflinching loyalty and regular payment of tribute they always appreciated and admired profusely. The Time, London Wrote:
…….As a friend we may hope to find in him [Gulab Singh] a steady adherent of that qualified British ascendancy to which he owes his rise.
Gulab Singh was always ‘eager to lick the dust before’ the British feet. He showed readiness to rescue them from their declining coffers and the deficit of their treasury by accepting to pay them indemnity and tribute in exchange of the hilly areas in whose annexation they were not interested in face of the cost of management and occupation, besides their unproductiveness.The Governor-General, Lord Hardinge, considered:
The occupation of the whole of this territory was inadvisable as it would largely increase the extent of our frontier, and the military establishment for guarding it. The districts in question, with the exception of the comparatively small Valley of Kashmir, were for the most part unproductively and unlikely to pay the cost of occupation and management.
On the other hand, the ceded tract comprised the whole of the hereditary possessions of Gulab Singh, who being naturally eager to obtain an indefeasible title to them, came forward and offered to pay the war indemnity if constituted independent ruler of Jammu and Kashmir. It was recognized that the transfer of these two provinces of Gulab Singh would materially weaken the Sikh power, secure the war indemnity, mid form a pleasing recompense to Gulab Singh, whom the British wished to reward for his conduct and services.
The reaction in London to these arrangements, made by Lord Hardinge, was quite encouraging. Peel informed him that there was ‘universal approval and admiration of your policy from first to last’,
Dr. Abdul Ahad is a well-known historian of Kashmir. He presents a perspective on the Kashmir issue and talks about Kashmir’s history and individuality and personality. For feedback the author can be mailed at drahadhist@yahoo.co.in
