Anuttama Banerji
Water is a unique resource that shapes all physical and biological processes. It is a resource that touches human lives. This ‘wonder liquid’ is known for its fluidity and is associated with human culture. It is closely linked to life and regeneration and is the ‘elixir of life’. However, water has now become a scarce resource – a fact that can no longer be ignored.
In this context it is necessary to note that natural resource scarcities are likely to lead to conflict and violence; instability; and hamper regional security. One is aware that pressure on vital resources has become more severe over the years. States are largely depending on the scarce resources for their needs and are constantly competing with each to wrestle control of these resources. We need to look at the question of water security in this context.
Kuntala Lahiri Dutt argues that the relationship between water and society is complex because ‘control over water’ has been a symbol of social and political power in contemporary South Asia.
Water is a resource that has been controlled by the village elites at the local level, while at the level of the nation state, states have asserted their ownership of water resources and built ‘empires of water’ that are inextricably linked with national identities and pride. Control of water has been based on cultural constructions of water and dams are the traditional symbol of water control, political capital and moral authority. Dams are associated with development in South Asia.
In the 21st century, water related issues have taken a front-seat in international politics. Nation states are now engaged in disputes and conflicts over water sharing. Rivers which were meant to quench the thirst of individuals who came to its banks now stand divided as nations quarrel on the water that flows through these mighty rivers.
South Asia is no exception to the rule and water resources are seen as a ‘commodity’ rather than a natural endowment here. It is the home of three major river systems-the Ganga, Indus and the Brahmaputra crises cross the region and impact the geography, culture and economy of the region.
Rapid industrialization, agricultural development and urbanization have led to tensions in the region over the available of water. When limited water resources are available, water issues tend to be viewed as a matter of national security. In such a scenario, natural resources become relevant sources of military action because they constitute important factors of a nation’s power.
Differences over water sharing continue to exist between different states in South Asia. However, unlike other conflicts, the states in the region have attempted to resolve conflicts over water sharing. The Ganges Water Sharing Treaty (GWST) was signed between India and Bangladesh in 1996 and the dispute over the Farakka barrage has also been resolved though disputes over the river Teesta continue to be a source of tension in the relations. The Mahakali Treaty between India and Nepal was signed in 1996 but the treaty has not been ratified by the Nepalese Parliament. However, the Indus Water Treaty signed between India and Pakistan in 1960 is the most successful treaty on water sharing. This paper will attempt to re-examine the ‘Indus Water Treaty’ (IWT) and try to discuss its relevance for both the states of India and Pakistan.
The Indus River System
The Indus and its tributaries constitute one of the largest river systems in South Asia. The main Indus river rises in Tibet and after flowing through Jammu and Kashmir enters Pakistan. The river Jhelum rises in Verinag, in the Kashmir valley before entering Pakistan. The Chenab river rises in Lahaul in Himachal Pradesh, India and flows through Jammu before entering Pakistan.The Sutej rises in Tibet and flows through Punjab before entering Pakistan. The river Ravi rises in Kulu and then flows westwards into Pakistan. the river Beas rises in Himachal Pradesh and flows wholly within India. The Kabul and Kurram rivers rise in Afghanistan. The waters of the Swat in Peshawar valley join the Kabul river. The waters of the Indus are thus shared by four countries, China, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan.
The river Indus is a part of the culture of both India and Pakistan. The Indus river has been the cradle of civilization since centuries and millennia. The Indus Valley civilization is well known and a description of the same is not required. Over the years, various religions and cultures have thrived on the banks of the Indus giving it a distinct cultural identity. The banks of the Indus have absorbed various religious and cultural traditions like Sufism, Hinduism, Buddhism and of course Islam. The Buddha is said to have lived along its banks while Guru Nanak, the founder of Sikhism is said to have attained enlightenment while bathing in the Indus. The legend of Sohni Mahiwal is also associated with the river. It is a river that has traversed both history and geography. It is thus a river that has shapes our identity as it flows through time and space. During the British period, the irrigation system within the Indus was considerably developed.
The Sukkur Barrage was constructed in 1923 by the British who ‘colonized the river’ for their own monetary and fiscal benefit. The Indus river was merely a tool for the British rulers who started the long drawn out of process of ruining the river that was once referred to as a ‘mahasagar’ by the inhabitants of the river valley. The British very conveniently stated that the Sukkur Barrage would “convert a desert into a garden,” during the stone laying ceremony of the Sukkur Barrage. According to the British, Indus was developed modern and progressive with the coming of the barrage. What lay in the future is a completely different story.
The vivisection of the river
The Indus river emerged as a political issue when India and Pakistan emerged as two separate states in 1947. The creation of land boundaries necessitated the creation of water boundaries as well. The Indus and its tributaries also bore the brunt of the holocaust called the partition. The newly created state of Pakistan felt that it was ‘vulnerably dependent’ on India and a disruption of flows was reported on 1 April 1948 when East Punjab cut off supplies to the canals crossing into Pakistan. This caused ‘acute distress’ to the the average Pakistani and permanently impacted the Pakistani psyche. Canal water to West Pakistan was restored on 30 April 1948 and an ‘Agreement on the Canal Water Dispute’ was signed at the Inter-dominion Conference on 4 May 1948 which recognized East Punjab’s rights to cut off supply to the west eventually. But the legal viability of the document became an issue with India calling it a treaty and Pakistan calling it a statement. After several rounds of negotiation, the matter finally reached the doorstep of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) popularly known as the World Bank after a call for early resolution of the conflict was made by David Lilienthal, former Chairman of the Tennessy Valley Authority (TVA).
David Lilienthal argued that the an early solution of the conflict was essential in order to ensure that another war on Kashmir was not fought. It can be suggested here that this statement linked the water conflict to the larger Kashmir issue.
Eugene Black, the former President of the World Bank was impressed by Lilienthal and offered the World Bank’s good offices to resolve the water sharing dispute. The first steps towards the
IWT were thus taken. In February 1954, the World Bank proposed that (a) historic withdrawals must be continued but not necessarily from the same sources (b) the three eastern rivers were assigned to India and the three western rivers were assigned to Pakistan (c) Pakistan would have a transition period of five years to construct link canals to allow replacement of water supplies from the eastern rivers. The Indus was thus ‘officially partitioned’. India accepted the recommendations in March 1954. Pakistan agreed to the recommendations after India agreed to partly finance the construction of replacement works (Tarbela Dam on the Indus and Mangla on the Jhelum among others).
The Treaty was finally signed between India and Pakistan in 1960. Apart from the 1954 recommendations, the treaty also stated that India would not store or construct any storage works on the western rivers. More importantly, India was allowed to use the water of the western rivers for hydroelectricity before the rivers entered Pakistan. A Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) and a dispute settlement mechanism was also established.Overall, in a nutshell it can be added that Pakistan was allocated 80% of the waters while India had access to 20% of the waters though India’s historical usage of the Indus and its tributaries stood at 10%.
Worldwide Responses to the treaty
The treaty has stood the test of time and is viewed by all as a successful example of conflict resolution especially in view of the fact that India and Pakistan have fought at least three wars since the signing of the treaty. Indians and Pakistani commentators continue to be critical of the treaty. Indians are unhappy because some of the projects planned by the Indians on the western rivers have been stalled due to Pakistan’s objections. The Salal Hydal power project was accepted by Pakistan after some modifications by Pakistan. But differences over other projects -Tulbul or Wullar, Baglihar and Kishenganga still remain. Work on Tulbul was stopped fifteen years ago and has not resumed yet.
Pakistanis are also objecting to the fact that India has the right to build storage facilities on the
western rivers that belong to them. Article III (4) of the Treaty basically precludes the construction of any storages by India on the western rivers, except to a careful extent mentioned in the Annex D and E which also specify a host of technical conditions. The IWT is therefore very technical in nature and this poses a problem. The IWT is complicated because the treaty places strict restrictions on Indian projects to safeguard Pakistan’s interests. Thus the IWT is both permissive and restrictive towards India. This brings the people of Jammu and Kashmir into the picture in a major way who are the staunchest critics of the treaty. While projects like Salal, Tulbul, Baglihar and Kishenganga are formulated to serve the interests of the Kashmiris, all project details require the prior nod of Pakistanis. This has led to indefinite delay in implementing the projects. Pakistanis often accuse the Indians of planning works which are a violation of the IWT and eventually the projects get stuck in cold storage for years. India feels that Pakistan often adopts a negative and biased approach and deliberately obstructs any effort made by India to utilize the limited waters of the western rivers. There have been calls to scrap the treaty on a regular basis as most Kashmiris feel their interests were totally ignored while the IWT was framed. Similar calls for abrogating the IWT were also made in the aftermath of the Kargil War but to no effect.
The Revision of the IWT
Is the revision of the IWT possible today? The answer can be both a ‘yes’ and ‘no’. The IWT is definitely a successful example of conflict resolution. Ramaswamy R. Iyer argues that the dividing the river system into segments was not the ideal solution and a better solution would have involved the joint management of the river waters. This solution however was not suitable considering the level of hostility shared between the two neighbors. He contents that a share of 20% of the water to India was not ipso facto low and that historical usage did not determine a country’s future needs or requirements. This treaty is a like a harbinger of hope that disputes and conflicts between India and Pakistan can be resolved on the negotiating table and not through conventional war.
Pakistan’s Misgivings
In this context, it is also important to remember that Pakistan fears giving any form of structural control to India on the IWT issue. 12 The Indus and its tributaries are extremely important for the Pakistani state and the current political dispensation which is struggling to release itself from the claws of the military needs to tighten its control over the waters of the Indus to stay relevant in Pakistan. The government won elections in 2013 by promising the people that they will work on three agenda (3Es) the severe energy shortage, the underperforming economy, and the rise of religious extremism. All the three promises can be fulfilled if Pakistan flexes its muscles on the IWT issue. The changing climate is affecting water availability in Pakistan with the World Bank including Pakistan in the list of countries that face a massive water scarcity in the coming years. This argument has a theoretical basis. Jessica Tuchman Mathews has stated that environmental decline and climatic change are major sources of insecurity for a state. She elaborately states that environmental decline occasionally leads to conflict when scarce water resources must be shared between states.
Kashmir and the IWT
A discussion on the Indus Water Treaty is incomplete without a discussion on Kashmir. It is reasonably alright to state that the ‘Kashmir dispute’ is not just about Kashmir. Religion and geographical contiguity are two key aspects of the Kashmir Conflict. But a third and less talked about issue relates to the water issue. The Indus river and its tributaries run through the heart of Kashmir. Today, the content of the dispute is a far cry from what it was in 1947. The Indus river system has from the beginning played a crucial role in the dispute’s evolution. However, the relevance of the issue at hand has changed systematically over the years. The territorial dispute is now taking a backseat and river-water issues are now extremely important. The territorial issue has almost reached a de-facto settlement. Today’s dispute is less about Kashmir and Kashmiris and more about a river system having its headwaters in Kashmir. The raison d’être of the Pakistan’s existence may be linked to Kashmir but today, Kashmiris and the supposed atrocities committed against them is not the only reason why Pakistan demands Kashmir or wants Kashmir. Kashmir and its river system is crucial for Pakistan’s very survival.
In this context, Pakistan cannot be defined as a purely revisionist state but a state that wants to derive maximum benefits from the existing status quo. It will be interesting to see in the coming years how Pakistan will look at the border dispute considering the stakes are much higher now.
From a purely realist perspective, one can guess that Pakistan may not want to alter the existing status quo and be viewed as the aggressor and create problems for itself primarily because Pakistan faces serious threats to its very survival due to natural calamities and climate change. Pakistan may not use its offensive military capabilities against India in this scenario.Kashmir is being tacitly settled because neither side believes keeping the historical dispute alive will be of any particular importance except at the rhetorical level.
The Baglihar Dispute
On 12 February 2005, the binding decision of the World Bank appointed expert on the Baglihar dispute was handed over to both India and Pakistan. The eight gated spillways (without getting
into the technical details) specified in the dam’s design were a matter of concern to the Pakistanis who initiated a legal contest to ensure that the project was stopped. But. Raymond Laffitte, the Swiss civil engineer appointed as the neutral expert flatly endorsed the Indian position on gated spillways. He stated that the design of the spillways was not meant to control flood discharge but control against sediment building or silting.
The Pakistanis were annoyed and disappointed at the same time. They felt that the entire legal contest had not resulted in the Treaty’s strengthening but its very dilution. They angrily stated that the IWT was a bilateral instrument for preventing conflict and not silting of dams.
Kishenganga Dispute /Neelum Jhelum Another project which has ruffled feathers within the Pakistani establishment relates to the issue of the Kishenganga Dispute. In May 2010, Pakistan formally moved the International Court of Arbitration (COA) on the Kishenganga Dispute. The Kishengnaga river falls mostly on the Pakistani side of the Line of Control (LOC) and is one of the tributaries of the Indus. Currently, both the countries are busy constructing hydal power projects on the rivers and the projects lie 160 kms. away from one another on either side of the LOC. India is constructing an upstream hydroelctrical plant titled the Kishenganga Hydroelectric Project (KHP) while Pakistan’s China funded project is called the Neelam Jhelum Hydroelectric Project (NJHP). Both the projects involve extensive tunneling and are in close proximity to one another that is a major cause of dispute. The objections raised by the Pakistani side are the usual ones related to the faults in the design, problem with the diversion route and the disadvantages faced by the downstream co-riparian. In a surprising decision taken on 24 September 2011, construction was stayed till a final settlement was reached in the dispute.
India’s hydropower vs. Pakistan’s agriculture
It is absolutely essential to remember here Kashmir is important for India to fulfill its energy needs. India is the world’s sixth largest energy consumer. India’s energy needs are currently focused on thermal power sources especially coal. 19 It is clearly understood that hydropower is not optimally utilized. India needs all sources of energy to meet its energy needs. India is not in a tearing hurry on the question of nuclear energy since issues related to pricing, safety and liabilities of foreign companies are still left to be addressed. 20 India is keen to explore the option of suing solar energy to fulfill its power needs. The recent visit of the Indian Prime Minister to the United States and the Tesla headquarters to bring the Tesla Powercell is a case in point. But India does not want to lose out its chancing of utilizing hydropower either since solar power utilization is still a relatively expensive proposition.
For Pakistan, the river water issue is closely linked to its very survival. Maple croft placed. Pakistan at the bottom of the water security index in 2010. The Food Security Index in the same year also spelled boom for Pakistan. Food insecurity is a major problem in Pakistan and minus the waters of the Indus and its tributaries the problem of food insecurity will only become more severe. While the federal Territory of Islamabad and Punjab are better off, Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are worse off. Pakistan also faces extreme weather conditions that has aggravated the problem of food insecurity. It is believed that of the total food insecure population in the country, 22.4 % are extremely food insecure in the country. The country has also faced constant flooding time and again.
The Area of Concern
So can water as an issue be securitized especially keeping the IWT in mind? Ramaswamy R. Iyer says that the answer to this question lies not in defining anything, but by looking at the concerns.
He identifies three broad categories of ‘security’ issues; water needs for diverse purposes (i.e. availability, adequacy, reliability, dependence and vulnerability etc.) the danger posed by floods (i.e. need for mitigation, management, damage minimization and water quality problems (i.e.prevention or control of pollution and contamination) He argues that an evolved understanding on water sharing is required where states must co-operate must co-operate and establish warning systems to counter flood flows. Disaster preparedness, disaster mitigation and management of water quality across borders are also critical factors that prompt states to co-operate and reconcile with each other.
In this context, one can state at the end that conflict and co-operation go hand in hand as far as the IWT is concerned. Co-operation is possible in the future. Undala Z. Alam states that if India and Pakistan had followed the “water wars rationale” they should have gone to war, but they did not go to war over the Indus Waters due to “water rationality” i.e. any step taken by a state to secure its water supply in the long term both in quantity and quality. Thus, by signing the IWT, both countries have been able to safeguard their longterm water supplies from the Indus River Basin. This has however not led to a reduction in conflict over Kashmir. Joseph Korbel had stated in the past that the Pakistani authorities in 1947 were scared of Kashmir slipping out of Pakistan’s hands because Pakistan’s economic interest was largely attached to Kashmir’s water resources. Had India occupied the lower waters of the three rivers (Indus, Jhelum and Chenab).
Pakistan may have been strangulated economically.
Authors like Sundeep Waslekar talk about Pakistan’s keen desire to have total control over the Chenab river by occupying the Muslim majority areas of Jammu and the prized valley. He says that the whole battle in Kashmir actually revolves around the question of water and the whole Hullabaloo over the land is only an eyewash.
Finally the debate needs to atleast mention China and its desire to be a ‘hydrohegemon’. China is ambitious and since most of the rivers originate in the Tibetan plateau, China would definitely like to enhance its control over its water resources in the near future. However, this paper does not look into this aspect and hence only a very brief passing mention of the same is made. But at the end if we have to choose between having the treaty and not having it, most of us would favor having the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) because it has enhanced co-operation between the two countries and stood the test of time. B.G. Vergheese makes a similar argument and says that the Treaty has “triumphed”. Though IWT has its flaws and may oppose it, one feels that the Treaty must continue to be there to enhance the chances of dispute resolution because if India and Pakistan really ‘want to give peace a chance’ then the IWT can be a major catalyst towards the same.
Anuttama Banerji is a Freelance Features Writer & Political Commentator
