Dr Ajaz Afzal Lone
The judiciary remains a foundational institution in the architecture of constitutional governance, where the professional complementarity between the Bench and the Bar is a key determinant of judicial credibility and performance. This interrelationship is not merely institutional, but reflects the dynamic interaction between legal practitioners and judges in the delivery of justice interplay between legal practitioners and adjudicators in dispensing justice. Judicial processes are not confined to abstract legal doctrines but encapsulate the time’s social, economic, and political realities, rendering the courtroom a space where the complexities of society are determined and recorded. Advocates and judges, though distinct in their functions, serve a unified objective realisation of justice as envisioned by constitutional principles. Consequently, the processes governing judicial appointments must be rooted in the principles of fairness, competence, and institutional efficacy. The recent pronouncement by the Supreme Court permitting advocates with a minimum of three years’ practice to be eligible for judicial service underscores a progressive interpretation of judicial recruitment norms.
Although such reforms are aimed at increasing access to the judiciary, they need to be calibrated to take into account the pragmatic imperatives of legal expertise, courtroom experience, and the demands of adjudicative activities. Unless variations in experience between the Bar and the Bench are suitably controlled, they will negatively impact judicial consistency and public trust. There is a need to build a robust, merit-based, and contextually responsive recruitment system as society continues to grapple with the long-standing disjuncture between practicabilities and normative ideals. It is only through such carefully considered steps that the judiciary can continue to uphold constitutional legality while being responsive to changing expectations of the public within the complex legal environment in which it functions.
Why Judicial Experience Matters
Experience is crucial in shaping sound judgment and effective decision-making in every profession.
But for a judge, it is much more serious because it involves the protection of life and liberty rights. In other careers where mistakes can occasionally be corrected without doing irreparable damage, a judge’s decision has irreparable effects on people and society at large.
Judicial experience involves more than a knowledge of the law; it involves putting it into practice with justice, wisdom, and sensitivity. This theory-practice divide is glaringly evident in places like Jammu and Kashmir, where FIRs and court records are mostly in Urdu. Although not necessarily contentious, these are practically incomprehensible to new law graduates with no experience. It requires practical experience to read FIRs, challans, and depositions correctly. Without such a background, newly appointed judicial officers falter, resulting in delays, procedural lapses, and public disillusionment. Practical experience is hence not just necessary to bridge the theory-practice divide but to enable the judiciary to deliver justice and safeguard human dignity efficiently.
A Landmark Verdict: SC Restores Three-Year Bar Practice Rule
In a landmark judgment recalibrating standards for entry into India’s subordinate judiciary, the Supreme Court of India reinstated the mandatory requirement of three years of Bar practice for candidates aspiring to become Civil Judges (Junior Division). The ruling, delivered by a Bench led by Chief Justice B.R. Gavai in All India Judges Association v. Union of India (Writ Petition (C) No. 1022 of 1989), marked a decisive departure from the two-decade-old policy that allowed direct recruitment of fresh law graduates. The Court not only restored the requirement of professional legal experience but also clarified that such experience shall be reckoned from the date of provisional enrolment with a State Bar Council, not from the date of passing the All India Bar Examination (AIBE).
Historical Context: From Law Commission to Shetty Commission
This issue has evolved over the decades. It was first addressed in the 14th Law Commission Report (1958), chaired by M.C. Setalvad, which recommended that candidates with 3-5 years of practice should be eligible to appear for lower judiciary exams. In the All India Judges’ Association v. Union of India (1992), the Supreme Court endorsed the LCI’s recommendations and directed the creation of the All India Judicial Service (AIJS). However, in a 1993 review petition (Second AIJA Case), the Court reversed its stance, mandating a minimum of three years of practice as essential. It emphasised that real-life legal experience is necessary, as adjudication involves more than academic learning. This position was reversed again in the Third AIJA Case (2002), following the Shetty Commission’s suggestion that practical training could substitute courtroom experience. As a result, fresh law graduates were allowed to enter the judiciary, provided they underwent a 1-2 year training program.
The Court’s Legal Reasoning: Experience as a Prerequisite
In its present ruling, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the two-decade experiment with allowing fresh graduates had proven ineffective. Affidavits from several High Courts and State Governments mentioned particular difficulties caused by inexperienced appointees, such as:
Failures in conduct towards advocates and litigants
Difficulty managing court proceedings, especially urgent matters,
Inadequate understanding of procedural law, and
Failure to control the courtroom or uphold decorum.
The Supreme Court’s judgment is timely and much-needed to enhance the quality of the judiciary. By putting an end to the practice of directly appointing new law graduates as judges, the Court has aptly recognised that experience plays a vital role in the proper functioning of the judiciary. The decision reflects an understanding of the real challenges in courtrooms, such as managing proceedings, maintaining decorum, and dealing with advocates and litigants with maturity. However, a gap remains. Many young judges, despite their academic merit, often lack practical exposure and empathy, leading to irritable behaviour and difficulty connecting with the Bar. To truly reform the system, experience alone is not enough; there must also be structured training and mentorship to develop judicial temperament and a better understanding of litigation realities.
High Courts such as Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Kerala, and Patna all supported reinstating the practice requirement. These observations reflected a broad institutional consensus that prior legal practice is essential to develop judicial temperament and maturity. The Court, reaffirming its 1993 position, emphasised that “neither knowledge derived from books nor pre-service training can be an adequate substitute for first-hand experience in courtrooms.” It observed that judges, from their very first day, handle matters affecting life, liberty, and property. Exposure to adversarial practice, the Court reasoned, fosters empathy, deepens legal understanding, and refines judicial discretion. The Bench, therefore, held that three years of Bar practice are not only desirable but essential before assuming judicial office.
Counting Experience: Provisional Enrolment vs. AIBE
After affirming the practice requirement, the Court addressed when legal practice should be deemed to begin. Some High Courts, including Delhi, Punjab & Haryana, and Jammu & Kashmir, favoured using the date of provisional enrolments as the starting point. The Court agreed, stating that under the Advocates Act, 1961, a provisionally enrolled advocate is entitled to appear before courts. It rejected the alternative view that experience should begin only after passing the AIBE, noting that court exposure and skill acquisition begin with provisional enrolment. Therefore, the Court held that the minimum three years of practice shall be reckoned from the date of provisional enrolment with the State Bar Council.
Balancing Quality with Access in Judicial Appointments
A striking feature of the Court’s analysis is its careful balancing between the imperatives of administrative efficacy, quality control, and openness in recruitment. While the restoration of the practice requirement may marginally reduce the number of applicants eligible in any given cycle, the Court held that the overall benefit to the system outweighs this drawback. The aim is not merely to fill the vacancies, but to ensure that the appointees have the temperament, experience, and maturity to discharge the responsibilities of a judicial office. In addition, the Court analogised to the constitutional scheme under Articles 233 and 217, which requires practice conditions for appointments as District Judges and High Court Judges, respectively. By analogy, the three-year requirement for Civil Judge (Junior Division) was held to be consistent with the general constitutional scheme for judicial appointments.
A Step Forward: Strengthening Judicial Integrity and Public Trust
The Supreme Court’s decision in reinstating the compulsory three-year Bar practice as a requirement for joining the subordinate judiciary is a welcome step and a much-delayed reformation in India’s judicial appointment system. In reasserting the irreplaceable value of on-the-job experience in the courtroom, the judgment adds to the ideals of judicial competence, maturity, and sensitivity that are necessary for the administration of fair and effective justice. It ensures that future judges are not only theoretically well-qualified but also well-trained through learning by doing so that they can handle the enormous responsibility of judicial offices confidently and sensibly from the very beginning. This step not only instils greater confidence in the justice system among the people but also lays a solid foundation for a more competent, sensitive, and professional judiciary committed to the enforcement of the rule of law and the protection of the rights of all citizens.
The Author is currently working as an Assistant Professor in the University Institute of Legal Studies, Chandigarh University.
