Professor Rattan Lal Hangloo
When Zia ul Haq took over as dictator his publicized Nizam-e- Mustafa plan was different from Islamisation Programmes of previous governments.19Zia appeared to be more rooted in the native culture. Eventually he issued directives to government departments for Nimaz during office hours to be led by department heads. All business centers were obliged to close for Friday prayers. A committee was set up to revive the Islamic institutions of zakat and ushur. Islamisation of banking system in Pakistan was carried out. Hadud punishments were introduced for drinking theft, dacoity and adultery. Zia discouraged co-education but encouraged chard closed garments for women. A sharia faculty was established at the Quaid-i-Azam university in Islamabad, the council of Islamic ideology was empowered to make recommendations as to measures for bringing existing laws into conformity with the Quran and the sunnah (the sacred tradition in rule or custom)and the Islamic research institute was entrusted with the task of conducting research in Islam. Steps were taken to revise text books and curricula. The poor flocked to madrasas which gave them food and shelter the television and radio were ordered to redesign their Programmes according to the Islamic teachings. United States was happily watching these things because it suited them. With the eco of Iranian out cry of musalman-e-pakbaz the unwanted Muslims were eliminated and persons known for their commitment to an Islamic order were appointed to key government posts. According to Turkkaya he exhausted all of his political cards, including Islam, to legitimize his rule.
Infact all the measures Zia adopted were not motivated by his moral clarity or genuine interest in strengthening the institutional foundations of state by religious idealism but he wanted to wash his blood stained hands after Bhutto’s execution and to help United States to organize much needed Afghan Mujahedin movement in Pakistan and Afghanistan against Soviets. The process of building Afghan Mujahedin movement in Pakistan and Afghanistan against Soviets by CIA and ISI led to the integration of Terrorism into Pakistan’s foreign and security policy so much that it is very complex for any military or democratic establishment to deconstruct that integration particularly when the situation is not as war demanding as it was before collapse of Soviet Union.21 When Pakistani government felt that her citizens were finding the Islamist message attractive it gave the impression that it was on the same side.
Although Zia-ul-Haq’s own version of Islamic polity Bhutto’s legitimized execution but it did not resolve the main dilemma concerning the essence of Pakistan’s Islamic nationalism. Instead Zia-ul-Haq was left with no option but to make more and more concessions to fundamentalists. As a result his effort to make Pakistan a truly Islamic State and define her nationalism in terms of Muslim identity resulted in a making situation so much complex that all those, (among orthodox or modernists) who were genuinely interested in development of Pakistan got totally disillusioned. Mazhar Ali Khan very rightly says, “The process of Pakistan’s political degradation began long decades ago; however, in its last phase General Zia ul Haq worked with special devotion to destroy national institutions, emasculate political parties foster political corruption, and pervert accepted political values. The legacy he left behind him included a half baked political system and gangs of caretakers who remained determined to serve their benefactor’s mission of not allowing democracy to prosper in Pakistan repeatedly the cover of Islamisation has been used to make the plan for regression palatable. This is certainly no service to Islam, which is viewed by the people and many eminent scholars as the foundation for democratic egalitarian society.”But behind the scene was the Carter administration. To the national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided much welcome proof aggressive intensions of Soviet Union in the third world. In his report to Carter on the day of the invasion Brzezinski noted that, “both Iran and Afghanistan are in turmoil.” and the age long dream of Moscow to have direct access to Indian Ocean was in the process of being full filled.23 “it was Brzezinski’s portrayal of Brezhnev’s Afghan policy as a naked act of aggression and as a first step in challenging US positions in the gulf area that won Carter over to seeing the Soviets as implacable enemies and the invasion of Afghanistan as the gravest threat to world peace since 1945”.
In spite of the Presidents sense of shock and outrage, the invasion in no way came as a surprise to Washington. US intelligence-both air surveillance and intercepts-had shown Soviet forces being readied for action in Afghanistan since late November 197925. United States had also begun a programme of direct financial and material support for the Afghan anti-communist opposition in July 1979, which was stepped up as the year progressed. By early September Admiral Stanffield Turner, Carters director of central intelligence had asked for several “enhancement options.” to be worked out, including one that would provide funds for Pakistanis to purchase lethal military equipment for the insurgents and a like amount of lethal equipment ourselves for Pakistanis to distribute to insurgents.26We must remember that each of these experiments with Islamic dictatorship or democracy in Pakistan only strengthened the voices of fundamentalists and blurred the vision of countries institutions for modernity. But it suited to the interests of Anglo- American block and since they were its silent sponsors.
But the US planning was soon overtaken by events in Afghanistan itself. In February 1980 barely six weeks after the Soviet invasion, Zbigniew Brzezinski’s went to Pakistan, where he discussed about the expansion of a covert action programme with General Zia and visited Afghanistan frontier where he was photographed waving a Kalashnikov rifle roughly in the direction of border line.27 “On his way home Brzezinski stopped in Saudi Arabia, where he agreed a Saudi matching contribution for the Mujahedin to any thing the Americans would provide. Well before Carter had been defeated by Ronald Regan in the US Presidential election in Afghanistan could and should be made into a Soviet Vietnam.”28 By this time a number of new US programs to counter radical communist regimes in third world were well under way including Yemen, Angola and tiny Caribbean island Grenada…………The beginning US offensive in Islamic world became much easier because of the Muslim reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan Moscow’s decision not only made many nationalist regimes turn against it-the Islamabad meeting of 35islamic nations in January 1980 condemned “Soviet military aggression against Afghan people” but it also de-legitimized the left and made it easier for Islamist agitation to find an audience in middle east North Africa, even in Muslim South east Asia. For many Islamists, especially new recruits to the cause29 “The Soviet Union and Communism became the main enemy and the united states a tactical ally in deed, if not in word. For the Saudis, the US support for the Afghan Mujahedin was essential. The head of Saudi general intelligence department Prince Turki-al-Faisal told CIA allies we do not do operations we do not know how all we know is write checks.”
For Pakistan’s military leader General Zia ul –Haq, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan implied both opportunity and threat, though the former out weighed the latter. Zia believed from very early on that the intervention meant a chance to let the Islamist movements that he sponsored become the internationally supported Afghan opposition.31 It also meant that Pakistan, in the eyes of the United States and Britain could shed the stigma it obtained with Zia’s coup the execution of his civilian Predecessor Z.A.Bhutto and the burning of US embassy in Islamabad by local Islamistsin1979.In other words, Zia could have it both ways he could full fill his dream of directing a jihad and receive Western support.
While doing so Zia’s plans were greatly helped by third world condemnation of Soviet invasion as did non-aligned movement during its meeting of foreign ministers in new Delhi in February 1981. at which a Pakistani-sponsored resolution was passed over a much milder Indian version.32 Within the Muslim world Iran and even Libya-not generally considered friendly to Zia’s regime-were willing to cooperate with him in support for the Afghan Mujahedin.33( Within Pakistan Zia left the organization of the support for the Afghan Islamists, and for more than 1.5million refugees who lived in the camps on the Pakistani side of the border, to the head of military inter-services intelligence ISI General Akhtar Abdur Rahman. General Akhtar an old classmate of Zia’s graduating with him in the last class of the British Indian military academy before independence and known for his haterid of India and for his dedication to the concept of Jihad. The system of supplies and political control that Akhtar built put his own organization at the center, with Saudi Arabia and United States as the main funds, and Egypt and China as the main deliverers of Soviet type weapons. Akhtar also organized training camps for the Mujahedin, giving pride of place to recruits from Hikmatyar’s Hezb-i-Islami. The instructors in these camps were Pakistani’s though American and British Personnel were in place to train Pakistani officers in the use of the newly acquired weapons. From 1984 onwards the CIA helped run training centers for Afghan and Foreign Mujahedin in Egypt and probably also in at least one of the Gulf States. Reportedly, General Akhtar visited the latter, but did not generally approve of these camps, since they took recruitment and training in these camps away from his supervision.34Untill1983 United States kept within the framework of aid to the Mujahedin established by Carter administration. This meant that washing ton paid for small amounts of weapons and other supplies that came to the Afghan resistance through third countries.
The American aid distributed through Pakistani agencies –was considerably less in total during the first two years of the conflict than that paid for by Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries. Both the State Department and CIA still held relations with Pakistan to be too cool to envisage a major American effort through that country. There was also a considerable resistance in the bureaucracy, especially at State, against confronting Soviets too directly especially since no body seemed able to come up with a concrete plan of how any ore extensive American involvement would figure out. But most important of all was the firm belief in the CIA and intelligence organizations across the western world that Mujahedin could not over time inflict serious casualties on Soviets. Investing in Afghan resistance would be a losing proposition. It would be far better to spend money and effort in re-establishing a relationship with Pakistan and thereby shore up the struggle against further soviet encroachments in the region.
Arne Westad remarks, “Getting to know the general and his administration took lot of money aian1981 the United States provided Islamabad with six year 3.2billion economic and military assistance program, including the delivery of forty F-16 jet Fighters.A US National Security Intelligence estimate passed in November 1982 found with a certain understatement that the US Pakistani deal on economic aid and weapons sales undoubtedly has strengthened the Pakistani International position and restored some of its self confidence.” During his visit to Washington the General. Zia pushed for more, including a tacit US acceptance of Pakistan’s Nuclear weapons program. Even though both Reagan and Shultz warned against any development of nuclear weapons the secretary noted to the president that they must also recognize how we handle nuclear issue can have a profound effect on our ability to continue to cooperate with Pakistan in supporting the Afghan freedom fighters. In pursuit of further American aid General. Zia not only subtly stressed his strong attachment o china and hinted that the Chinese remain faithful to their policies and agreements.”
For Pakistan and ISI the increase in aid to Mujahedin was a God sent opportunity. Since the major proportion of aid was distributed by Islamabad so Zia claimed credit for it and there by formed the political shade of Afghan opposition almost at will. As General Yusuf the head of ISI Afghan Bureau put it, “the CIA would arrange and pay for shipment to Karachi notifying us of Arrival dates once the vessel docked the ISI took over storage and distribution. The ISI made sure that it was the Islamist movements and especially Hikmatyar’s Hezb-i-Islami that received most of the aid especially of new weapons. By 1986 the battle Zia had already begun to believing that Soviets would have to withdraw sooner rather than later and that the battle for post communist.
When the news of air crash killing of Ziaul Haq, was disclosed to the president Ghulam Isaq Khan he consulted his senior colleagues to get their consensus to support and strengthen his presidency in accordance with constitutional provisions. But whatever recommendations were made to President, the part of the process included over emphasis of defense of Islamic values. Although Benazir genuinely wanted to move Pakistan towards democratization but her political campaign was mostly dominated by Kashmir issue. The posters dotted entire Pakistan with the slogan „Kashmir Banega Pakistan. Such designs consistently preserved the false consciousness of masses who wanted to move towards a more secular political terrain. It encouraged those in the army establishment who firmly believed that Pakistan did not deserve democratic polity because of their ISI was too much intertwined with CIA Under all dictatorial regimes Pakistan created elite units in army through ethnic interests. That is why at present or in near future if any organization in Pakistan enlists the support of jihadis can also take over Pakistan because the Pakistani military has althrough been taught to be sympathetic to radical Islam which was outer cover of the states political ideology. Since Pakistani army worked in connivance with CIA. The laters primary motive was to enlist success against Soviets in cold war and use assistance of Pakistani army in realizing their ambition. As a result Pakistan followed a serious neglect both in her domestic and foreign policy. Pakistan was made to patronize radicalization of Islam for building the scaffolding to restrict the spread of communism. It was in this process that Pakistan failed to explore the other tools of legitimacy as a nation state other than politicization of Islam which suited to Western and American interests at that time. Before 9/11 US did not deter Taliban from waging conflict or pressuring India when hijacking of Indian plane took place to Qandhar.
During Musharaf’s regime also Pakistan replicated the Arab influences in order to extend their influence by relying on more indirect methods including propaganda, terrorism and use of surrogate clients such as Al, jihad, Alfaran etc. A renowned Kashmir analyst, Murtaza Shibli very rightly remarks, “The proverbial trio of Pakistani politics-Allah, Army and America seem to have been reconfigured in reverse order with Americans enjoying on the top. The US influence is so powerful that they virtually seem to be running every aspect of Pakistani Life as allowed by General Musharaf in his last years of rule. They are said to have un acknowledged military basis, secret prisons and torture centers with powers to detain Pakistani citizens and thousands of secret agents running around in the country without any legal or bureaucratic fetters. This is the main reason that Americans are against the reinstatement of Chief Justice Iftikhar Mohammad Chaudhary who was adamant in upholding the law and wanted to know the fate of thousands that have gone missing in Musharaf’s regime with many of them ending up in secret American prisons and torture cells. The majority of the Pakistanis see the US war on terror the main reason for problems in tribal areas and resultant suicide bombings. Speaking at Kashmir rally on 5th February 2008 in Lahore, Jamat-i-Islami leader Liaquat Baloch castigated president Musharaf for acting as tool in the hands of Washington to make Pakistan a failed State as per US agenda.”
From all these details it becomes amply clear that during the cold war there has been consistent radical Islamist orientation in south Asia. In this Pakistan was tutored and patronized by America and suddenly from 9/11 Pakistan is forced to give up what it has grown as part and parcel of her political personality at the hands of her politicians and the US even though such a policy has denied Pakistani nationalism the much needed firm foundation. Now even if the Pakistani State is trying to transcend to democratic norms that may not suddenly change things at the fundamental level so quickly because Pakistani army has to get equipped with qualities that are part of modern fighting forces and such an openness, trust and respect at all levels. Even now Pakistan continues to face a major domestic crisis because of the possibility of collapsing of military force and the presence of NATO forces in her immediate neighborhood. The factionalism of domestic politics has crept into the ranks of Pakistani army. Pakistan is discovering now that US military supplies to Pakistan were not with out influencing her policies and politics from the very beginning of cold war.
The country is thrust into a situation with its neighbours which can be characterized an era of no war and no peace in between. Neither her use of arms nor her negotiations with India or America have provided solution to Kashmir problem. Her real sympathy for Kashmirees on religious grounds diminished once for all when the Kashmirees were subjected to worst suffering in the recent past. Pakistan is not understanding that by and larger the efficacy of terrorism in fulfilling the political goals of any regime has failed. Either those countries using terrorism have faced international isolation or sanctions and other punishments.
For some regions terrorism must have worked as a logical political strategy to achieve their goals aiming at social revolution or nationalist movement but for Pakistan particularly in Kashmir’s case it has grown hatred and the dehumanization that was carried out in Kashmir in the process. This strategy is no more seen in Kashmir heroic, successful, inspiring for masses to support it. Today a sizeable section among Kashmirees are reluctant to be dragged into conflict worried more about internal threats than about Pakistan’s proposals for their political future .During the struggle thousands of people died, lots of resources were wasted, economic development was almost arrested and living standards were held back. Kashmiri intellectual life was crippled. Militancy brought no freedom but more quarrels, splits and inter -group conflicts. India was not expelled from Kashmir; nothing good came out of it except decades of suffering and turmoil. The much prophesied revolution and freedom did not take place at all. Recently President Zardari characterized them as terrorists.
Infact Pakistan government has no incentive to end Kashmir conflict even if Kashmirees do not want that. But it helps the Pakistani government to hike military budget to ensure domestic stability by coercion. Even the state sponsored terrorist pressure or violence that is used against India as a conscious integral strategy of her foreign and security policy has not helped Pakistan at all. Instead it has virtually shattered Pakistan’s economy. The end of cold war has penalized Pakistan that is why the region has become riskier place in the world.
The inability of the religion to play a major role as a political ideology into nation’s politics can largely be attributed to the ethnic/tribal diversity found within in Pakistan. Jinnah and Ayub Khan may not have been able to eliminate religion as a factor in politics, but the leadership of religious parties has also not been able to make Pakistan a sectarian state. Interestingly India patronized and promoted the linguistic and cultural diversity to strengthen the foundations of her nationhood. I think the basic mistake that Pakistan did was to continue radicalization of Islam as the basis of nationhood. Particularly in an area where more than 57% of countries territory is inhabited by people belonging to different ethnic and tribal cultures and these groups always subordinated their religious loyalty to their respective ethnic and tribal loyalties.41Dubbing NWFP with too much of terrorism is also viewed with suspicion that Pakistan is containing opposition in these areas under the pretext of eliminating terrorists while the real camps are elsewhere in her territory.
The main dilemma that has confronted all the rulers of Pakistan since Ayub Khan, is that, since 1958 the justification of Pakistani nationalism has been the ideal of an Islamic state, an essential basis of legitimacy in order to overcome all the ethnic divisions that compartmentalize the population yet the very idea of Islamic society is more divisive than it is unifying because there can be no agreement as to what the Muslim is they way they treated Kashmirees, Baloches, Shias, Ahmadyas and Afghans.
All neighbours of Pakistan would love to see the country fully transcend to real democracy, whatever it is worth, but even this time the transition to democracy may also end up as a brief interval that her history has occasionally seen in the past. With the end of cold war the Anglo-American block has not lost its appetite for political intervention in the country’s politics though after cold war the impression of some of the strategic analysts in South Asia was that the country has been used by America as a toilet paper during the cold war era and in return small bounces that trickled in the shape of military and other aid packages, have not helped the country to base her institutions and economy on firm footing. The country is in serious trouble and the politicians are either feigning innocence or deliberately shutting their eyes to reality. Pakistani people do not want conflict but the institution of their army can not survive with out that hence the struggle between her armed forces for perpetuation of dictatorial regime and people‟s aspiration for democracy has the immense potential to tear Pakistan apart.
Pakistan’s diplomacy is virtually in shambles. On one hand it is can not continue the alliance with United States that is viewed by radical Muslims not only in Pakistan but all over the world as unholy but on the other hand after9/11 Pakistan is also suspect in eyes of world. Pakistan has nothing to transact in foreign policy today therefore if Pakistan continues her involvement in terrorist activities in India or elsewhere that clearly illustrates Pakistan’s frustration because of her domestic instability and external isolation and if it continues with same attitude such outcomes may not be welcomed for long and will have awesome consequences for the stability of Pakistan itself.
The issue that should deeply concern Pakistan is the sharp divide between public opinion and public policy which has been increasingly growing as a result of states unwillingness and inability to protect her citizens from violence. Unfortunately that is the mature sign of failed state. This will spell the end of even whatever symbolism of democracy Pakistan has embraced. The stable Afghanistan is needed by Anglo-American block to thwart Russians designs. Afghanistan’s emergence is viewed by Pakistan as a strong threat but with United State it is a historical necessity and inevitability. Pakistan is made to cooperate much against her wishes in stabilization of Afghanistan’s victory for Anglo- American block is a far fetched thing because of many reasons rooted in strategic complexities of the region.
Pakistan can not act sincerely in her structural transformation if it continues to support US designs in the region when US is suspect in the eyes of Muslims at popular level. With out committing herself to true democratic values Pakistan is speedily submerging internationally under the weight of her own mistakes and when Pakistan should realize that Peace, stability and economic development are more desirable ends than an end less struggle to facilitate the realization of US ambitions will amount to posing great risks to the Pakistan’s survival as a nation.
Pakistani leadership needs to understand that in 21st century if their nation state has to embrace modern democratic and administrative principles in totality they may not be consistent with the ideals of Islamic state because so long as populism rests with fundamentalists, the power to people would mean subjection of state power to fundamentalist forces or ethnic fragmentation of communities that constitute Pakistan. The state needs to deconstruct the politicization of Islam that results in false glorification ideal of Islamic state, props up the expectations of orthodox thinkers about the government’s policies to change socio-economic scenario. If we separate political culture from theology we are sure to find consensus among people whatever the nature of their ethnicity or level of orthodoxy because true Islam stands for translating individual virtue into community power. The different groups may differ as to the characterization of good but they will surely agree that personal qualities are always effective in influencing the public .The true Muslim is one whose glance is enough to change the fate of world for good not for worse. All the leaders and followers need to keep in mind that they are bound together because of Allah’s will for an orderly social world of believers and treachery with people in and out side the country is supreme evil that too for petty political reasons.
Professor Rattan Lal Hangloo ,Chair of Indian studies, University of West Indies
